The Roman Army of the Mid-Republic: From Conscription to Volunteer Service

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Abstract

The Roman army of the mid-Republic was known as the manipular legion, a unique tactical structure which remained in force for roughly 200 years (*c.* 315–107 BC). Up until the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), the Roman army had been a temporary militia based entirely on conscripted terms of service, which the Senate resupplied as needed. Property ownership was obligatory for recruitment. However, during the prolonged conflict of the Second Punic War, Rome had obtained a large overseas empire, which required permanent provincial garrisons. To recruit as many men as possible, the army occasionally suspended the property requirement for service in the legions. Attracted to the modest military pay and the prospect of a share of war booty a large number from the poorest social class began to volunteer for service in the legions. Over the ensuing decades, the Roman army began its gradual transition away from conscription and toward volunteer service. Polybius's detailed description of the mid-Republican army, combined with the nature of Rome's imperialistic endeavors, will be helpful in understanding the cause of this transition.

Keywords: maniple, hastati, principes, triarii, velites, cohorts, pilum, gladius hispaniensis

El ejército romano de la República Media: del servicio militar obligatorio al servicio voluntario

Resumen

El ejército romano de mediados de la República se conocía como la legión manipular, una estructura táctica única que permaneció en vigor durante aproximadamente 200 años (c. 315-107 a. C.). Hasta la Segunda Guerra Púnica (218-201 a. C.), el ejército romano había sido una milicia temporal basada completamente en condiciones de servicio reclutadas, que el Senado reabastecía según fuera nece-

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sario. La propiedad de la propiedad era obligatoria para la contratación. Sin embargo, durante el prolongado conflicto de la Segunda Guerra Púnica, Roma había obtenido un gran imperio de ultramar, que requería guarniciones provinciales permanentes. Para reclutar tantos hombres como fuera posible, el ejército suspendió ocasionalmente el requisito de propiedad para el servicio en las legiones. Atraídos por la modesta paga militar y la perspectiva de una parte del botín de guerra, un gran número de personas de la clase social más pobre comenzó a ofrecerse como voluntario para servir en las legiones. Durante las décadas siguientes, el ejército romano comenzó su transición gradual desde el servicio militar obligatorio hacia el servicio voluntario. La descripción detallada de Polibio del ejército republicano medio, combinada con la naturaleza de los esfuerzos imperialistas de Roma, será útil para comprender la causa de esta transición.

Palabras clave: manípulo, hastati, principes, triarii, velites, cohortes, pilum, gladius hispaniensis

罗马共和国中期的罗马军队：从征兵到志愿服务

摘要

罗马共和国中期的罗马军队被称为“中队制军团”，这是一种独特的战术结构，持续了大约200年（约公元前315年至公元前107年）。直到第二次布匿战争（公元前218年至公元前201年）之前，罗马军队一直是一支完全按照征兵服役的临时民兵，元老院根据需要进行补给。财产所有权对征兵而言是必需的。然而，在第二次布匿战争的长期冲突中，罗马获得了一个庞大的海外帝国，这需要长期的省级驻军。为了招募尽可能多的人，军队有时会暂停关于s军团服役的财产要求。微薄的军饷和战利品分享的可能性吸引了来自最贫困社会阶层的大量人群，他们开始自愿加入军团。在接下来的几十年里，罗马军队开始逐渐从征兵制过渡到志愿服务。波利比乌斯对罗马共和国中期军队的详细描述，结合罗马帝国主义事业的性质，将有助于理解这一转变的原因。

关键词：中队，青年兵，壮年兵，后备兵，少年兵，步兵队，罗马重标枪，西班牙短剑(gladius hispaniensis)

The city of Rome came together as a monarchy on the banks of the Tiber River on the western coast of central Italy around 753 BC. Over the course of nearly two-hundred and fifty years, its rulers became increasingly corrupt forcing the city to make a radical decision. In 509 BC, Rome abolished the monarchy and established a Republic with a mixed constitution.[1] Though the city owed its prosperity to trade in its early years, warfare made it a formidable force in the ancient world. Yet Rome had always been too busy conquering the Italic peninsula to chronicle the story of their origins. The regal period and the early republic are, in fact, the most poorly documented periods of Roman history; it would take another five-hundred years for historians to consider recording the story of their roots. Such writers include, among others: first century Roman historian Titus Livius (Livy) (59 BC–17 AD) in *The History of Rome,* as well as Greek historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus (60-7 BC) in *The Roman Antiquities.* Dionysius stated that previous writers of Roman history, such as second century BC Greco-Roman historian Polybius (*c.* 200–*c.* 118 BC), "touched only in a summary way upon the early events that followed the founding of the city."[2] However, by the first century BC, archeological and epigraphic sources were not enough to create a comprehensive narrative of their past. Rome's origins, Livy states, traced "back beyond 700 years."[3] Time had claimed much of it, leaving behind many historical gaps. To fill the voids they crafted legends—such as that of Romulus and Remus—which made it exceedingly difficult to separate fact from folklore.

Historical literature written in the first century BC extended well beyond Rome's origin story, but the narratives were still oddly deficient, albeit in different ways and for different reasons. While the common themes concerned politics and war through the centuries, historians of this period did not incorporate details regarding the composition of the Roman military. Historian Adrian Goldsworthy suggests that this might be because such details would have already been well-known and thus, redundant.[4] Clearly, he was referring to Polybius. While Polybius' influential narrative in the *Histories* did not incorporate Rome's origin story, it did offer the most comprehensive, detailed data regarding the organization, tactics, and equipment of the Roman army during the period of the mid-Republic (264–133 BC). By this time Rome had already conquered most of the Italian Peninsula, hence Polybius's focus was primarily on the efforts it took for ancient Rome to extend its imperial power beyond Italy, particularly when it came to Carthage.

There were three wars that Rome waged against Carthage, one of the most affluent cities of the classical world located on the northern coast of Africa. These are known as the Punic Wars, the first of which Rome waged to gain influence over the strategic city of Messana on the island of Sicily.[5] The accounts regarding the First and Second Punic Wars (264–241 BC and 218–201 BC) depended on stories orally hand-

ed down since Polybius was born after these battles took place. He was, however, eyewitness to the Third Punic War (149–146 BC) making the final bloody conflict quite easy for him to write about.

In the *Histories* Polybius explains that the Roman army of the mid-Republic was known as the manipular legion. Its structure—explained in further detail below—remained in force for roughly 200 years (*c.* 315–107 BC).[6] Up until the Second Punic War, the Roman army had been a temporary militia based entirely on conscripted terms of service, which the Senate resupplied as needed. Property ownership was obligatory for recruitment.[7] The prolonged conflicts of the Second Punic War were often disastrous, but they had galvanized Roman resistance. By implementing skillful defensive strategies, Rome ultimately secured hegemony over the western Mediterranean despite its many misfortunes on the battlefield. This expansion required permanent

Figure 1. The stele of Kleitor depicting Polybius, Hellenistic art, 2nd century BC, Museum of Roman Civilization. Licensing: this media file is in the public domain.

provincial garrisons and necessitated an increasing number of recruits to replace the devastating legionary losses. In an effort to make up for a growing deficit of propertied men, Rome occasionally suspended the land requirement for service. Attracted by the modest military pay, a large number of volunteers from the poorest social class began to join the legions. Over the ensuing decades, the Roman army began its gradual transition away from conscription and toward volunteer service. A concise sketch of Polybius's description of the mid-Republican army, combined with the nature of Rome's imperialistic endeavors, will be helpful in understanding the cause of this transition.

The organization of Rome's *early* military is a subject for which the surviving evidence is too limited to provide a detailed description. A major development did occur during the mid-regal period in the sixth century BC when Rome adopted the hoplite system of warfare. Hoplite warfare had developed in the early seventh century BC in Greece and spread from there to the Greek colonies in southern Italy.[8] The Romans conventionally attributed the adoption of the hoplite phalanx to King Servius Tullius who reigned between 578 and 534 BC. It was not until the second century BC when Polybius offered a thorough, carefully researched description of the Roman military as it existed between 264 and 146 BC.

The Roman legion of the mid-Republic comprised three rows, each containing ten tactical units called maniples. Commanded by two centurions and two rear-guard assistants called *optiones,* each maniple in the first two rows contained two centuries of sixty men for a total of one-hundred twenty men per maniple. The ten maniples in the third row each had one century of sixty men. [9] The total number of men per legion amounted to three-thousand. The gaps between the maniples in each row were equal in width to the frontage of a maniple, which, in turn, was the equivalent of twenty forward-facing men spaced roughly two feet apart from each other. To cover the gaps between the maniples, the military staggered each row.

The Roman army at this time was extremely hierarchical; its structure was organized on wealth, age, and social standing. Organized in a battle line three rows deep called the *triplex acies*, the legion's youngest and least skilled men—typically soldiers in their teens and early twenties called *hastati*—occupied the first row of the legion. The second row comprised men in the prime of life—usually in their mid-twenties and thirties—called the *principes*. The men in the third row, known as the *triarii,* were the oldest and most experienced soldiers.[10] Recruited from the youngest, poorest civilians, roughly twelve-hundred light infantry skirmishers known as *velites* stood in front of each legion (see Figure 2). By disrupting and confusing the enemy line, the *velites* made it easier for the higher-ranking soldiers to then step in for combat. However, being the first to confront the enemy made them a sacrificial component of the Roman army. Many lost their lives even before the battle was in full swing.



Figure 2. Roman manipular disposition after deployment, but before engagement. Licensing: this media file is in the public domain.

Adjoining the manipular legion were the *alae* (wings) who were not Roman, but recruited from the allied cities of Italy. The typical size of an *ala* depended on the campaign. Polybius states, "the Consuls send orders to the magistrates of the allied cities in Italy, from which they determine that allied troops are to serve: declaring the number required, and the day and place at which the men selected must appear."[11] Flanking the *alae* were the cavalrymen known as the *equites*—young aristocrats from the wealthiest Roman class with a titled privilege that allowed them to have their horses refunded when killed in battle.[12] There were three-hundred cavalrymen per legion, which the military divided into ten squadrons—thirty men each—called *turmae.* Three *decurions* commanded each squadron with the assistance of three *optiones*. Ten campaigns of military service were mandatory for the cavalrymen to be able to subsequently serve in public office.[13]

Wealth also played a significant role in the distribution of weapons in the mid-Republican army. Each *velite* carried several thinly constructed javelins. While being the first to confront the enemy put them at a serious disadvantage, Polybius states that the officers had to observe whether the *velites* showed "courage or the reverse on confronting dangers."[14] However, their pay was not dependent on their performance, nor did they benefit from a share of war booty.[15] In contrast, the legionary soldiers benefitted from significant protection. The *hastati* carried two different types of large javelins, one heavier than the other. Known as the *pilum,* this weapon had tremendous plunging power (see Figure 4). The *triarii* and *principes* carried a longer spear known as the *hastae*. All soldiers carried a sidearm—a short dagger called the *pugio.* Around the early second century BC, the Romans replaced the *pugio* with a larger version known as

the *gladius hispaniensis*—the Spanish short sword (see Figure 3). The cavalryman each carried a sturdy lance and shield, which, as Polybius states, they copied from the Greeks.[16] Their spear came with a butt spike which they could use as a secondary weapon. They, too, carried a *gladius*, although it was likely larger than that used by the infantry and which they employed when they lost or destroyed their spears.[17]

Wealthy soldiers wore a mail armor made of metal called the *loricae* (see Figure 5) and carried a rectangular convex shield called a *scutum,* which was two feet in width and four feet in length. In contrast, the *velites* wore a small square brass plate over their chest and carried a sturdy shield, round in shape called a *parma,* which had a diameter of about three feet.[18] All warriors wore metal helmets, but the *velites*' headgear was crestless. Sometimes they wrapped their helmet with wolf fur so that the officers could recognize them as *velites*. All other soldiers had three feathers in either the color purple or black arranged on the crest of their helmets.[19]

When it came to fighting strategies in the Republican army, the tactical space each soldier needed on the battlefield was considerably greater than that of the Greek or Macedonian hoplites, since Romans did not fight as a tightly-packed collective military unit. While each Roman soldier was part of a group called the maniple, they fought individually. Polybius states:

Figure 3. The gladius hispaniensis—or Spanish short sword—which originated in Iberia. This double-edged blade became the standard sword of the Roman army from the second century BC, after the Punic Wars. Licensed under the Creative Commons.

> [A]s their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man—because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing,—it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect.[20]

Polybius seems to suggest that the soldiers' flanks included three feet of space on either side, which presumably left three feet of corporal space that the soldier himself *and* his equipment occupied, for a total tactical clearance of about nine feet per soldier in each maniple. But, according to historian Michael J. Taylor, such a line-up would have taken up too much field space. A more reasonable setup submits that the three feet of space on the soldiers flanks included the physical space that the soldier himself occupied, thus leaving just under two feet of open space on either side of each soldier. This meant that each soldier controlled six feet of tactical clearance rather than nine.[21] Either way, this manipular arrangement implies that the Roman soldiers fought in a more open-order formation than the densely packed Greek-style phalanx.

Some scholars have doubted—even criticized—Polybius's claim that Roman soldiers always operated in such an open-order formation. Their criticism relies on information provided by fourth century AD Roman writer Flavius Vegetius Renatus (Vegetius), who claimed that when necessary (especially when the battlefield was small) Roman soldiers did fight in tight formation similar to that of the Greek phalanx.[22] In Book III of *De Re Militari*, Vegetius states that if the battlefield was not spacious enough, it would be "more advantageous to engage in close order than to extend your line too much."[23] However, it is important to keep in mind that unlike Polybius, Vegetius was far-removed from the period of history he was covering, having been born roughly six hundred years after the Punic Wars took place. More significantly, the fighting tactics as suggested by Vegetius would have presented serious strategic problems for the Roman infantry of the mid-Republic. Their army included launching weapons, such as the *pila,* as well as slashing/thrusting weapons like the *gladii*. These necessitated ample elbow room since operating them required their arms to swing about in various directions. In fact, Taylor states that the Roman soldier required significant space if only to prevent him from accidentally slicing his brother warriors.[24] Greek phalanxes, on the other hand, used only one type of weapon: a forward thrusting spear, which is what allowed them to fight in tightly packed formation.

To the extent that the enemy did not overpower them, the Roman army preserved their spacing while fighting. They also maintained the inter-manipular gaps throughout the duration of the conflict. Nevertheless, these gaps allowed for a very flexible, accordion-style legion which made it possible for the commanders and subordinates

Figure 4: Various pila of the Roman Republic—heavy Roman spears, approximately seven feet in length. The shaft was made of wood and was about four feet in length; the tip was made of iron and was about three feet in length. Licensed under the Creative Commons.

Figure 5: Detail of a Roman scale armour called the loricae. Each plate has six holes. The scales are then linked together in rows. Licensed under the Creative Commons.

to easily expand or—to a limited extent—shrink their line of defense based on the nature of the terrain, the character of the troops, or the strength and disposition of the enemy. The gaps also discouraged the enemy soldiers from penetrating, since Roman missile crossfire often overwhelmed these empty spaces. This kind of military elasticity, if properly maintained, ultimately helped the Romans to preserve the tactical integrity of the entire legion. They prevented panicky, less experienced soldiers from becoming intermingled with other units. Without these gaps the Roman maniples risked becoming a muddled, confused mass. Indeed, they risked defeat if they became too compact, such as happened at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, where Polybius reported that the Carthaginians pressed the Romans together and annihilated them.[25] Fifty-seven thousand Roman infantry faced roughly twenty-five thousand men at the center of the Carthaginian line, which was composed of Celt and Spaniard Carthaginian allies. The weight of the much larger Roman center pushed the smaller Carthaginian center back, eventually creating a concave enemy line in which the Romans soon found themselves trapped. The African flank units of the Carthaginian army then enveloped the Roman legions, compressing them into a disorganized body. Losing their manipular spacing, the Romans were unable to use their weapons effectively, causing the Carthaginians to slaughter them *en masse*.[26] As Polybius stated, "the circle becoming more and more contracted, they at last were all killed on the field."[27]

Since property ownership was a requirement for service, the census kept a record of land-owners from which the Senate selected men for mandatory conscription once a year, every year. What Rome did not have was a permanent standing army of professional soldiers. Polybius states that after the draft,

> the military tribunes dismiss them to their homes. But when the day has arrived on which they were all bound by their oath to appear at the place named by the Consuls (for each Consul generally appoints a separate place for his own legions, each having assigned to him two legions and a moiety of the allies), all whose names were placed on the roll appear without fail.[28]

Furthermore, throughout the mid-Republic, the army remained a temporary militia, which disbanded at the end of each battle. As for terms of service, Polybius states that all those selected for the legions must serve twenty years before they reach the age of forty-six, although the army did not require any man to serve in more than sixteen campaigns.[29]

Each battle took the life of thousands of men, but without a standing army of skilled soldiers, Rome had to constantly secure speedy training of new recruits. Perhaps Rome's unmitigated, humiliating disaster at Cannae, was due, in part, to the hasty training of rookies. Compounding this problem were the difficulties faced by the cavalry. Apart from the fact that Rome

likely recruited inexperienced *equites* as young as seventeen years of age, all ancient cavalrymen lacked stirrups. The rider could not generate the necessary leverage to pull the lance out of his victim without running the risk falling off his horse.[30]

Over time, the transient nature of the Roman system developed a string of serious disadvantages—exacerbated by Rome's expansion outside of the Italian peninsula. Land-owning farmers formed the majority of the recruits. Away from home for long stretches at a time caused an inordinate amount of hardship and sometimes financial ruin for their families since there was often no one to help till the soil or provide support for the harvests. A man's lengthy absence from home also made child-bearing—the future land-owning soldiers of Rome—more difficult. Furthermore, the acquisition of overseas provinces required large permanent provincial garrisons, which forced soldiers to spend even longer periods away from home in continuous military service. Service in the legions had become an unenthusiastic drudgery—not something Rome could afford if they wanted to hold on to hegemonic power.

For much of its existence, the army of the mid-Republic was always at war. Whether they were defensive campaigns; whether they reflected a desire for economic gain, or whether their initial goal had always been universal supremacy, scholars have been debating these issues since ancient times and continue to debate them in the modern age. Some ancient historians had a more favorable opinion of the wars of the mid-Republic than others. When comparing the tumultuous conflicts of the late Republic to those of the mid-Republic, Roman statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero (108–43 BC) criticized the ever-growing lust for personal ambition of certain politicians of the first century BC. He stated that while their forefathers ruthlessly annihilated Carthage during the Punic Wars they had "some special reason for what they did."[31] That reason, Cicero stated, was because the "Carthaginians violated treaties."[32] Contrarily, the men of the late Republic began to use the army as an instrument in service of their own personal ambitions.[33]

Polybius's assessment of the mid-Republican wars was not as favorable as Cicero's. He highlighted Rome's ruthless aim for universal power especially after the success of the First Punic War. Though he believed that Roman success in the Punic wars was the result of discipline, "[i]t was not," he recognized, "by mere chance or without knowing what they were doing that the Romans struck their bold stroke for universal supremacy and dominion, and justified their boldness by its success."[34]

Whatever their motives, scholarship knows for certain that the result of the mid-Republican wars was the acquisition of land, which directly benefited the Roman people. Success and prosperity, however, became a bench test for the survival of the Republic. The impulse to exploit their authority became ever stronger when executed from a position of growing supremacy.[35] After the Third Punic War, demographic and

territorial expansion did not witness a corresponding rise in land available for cultivation by country dwellers. Much of the land acquired during this period came increasingly under the control of aristocrats. The inevitable outcome was a rise in rural poverty, which created a growing male citizen population unable to meet the property requirement for military service.[36]

After the catastrophic losses of the Second Punic War, the lack of landed servicemen forced the Senate to occasionally drop the property requirement for service. In times of emergency, they recruited legionary soldiers from the poorest citizen-class: the so-called proletarians. These were men who did not own property. But despite the problems the military was facing with the propertied class, Rome was reluctant to completely abandon the militia system of conscripted, propertied servicemen.[37] It would take consul Gaius Marius's (157–86 BC) need to strengthen his forces for the Jugurthine War (112 BC–106 BC) to catalyze new changes to the Roman army. A consistent shortage of landed servicemen compelled Marius to break from tradition, which, as stated, typically turned to proletarian recruitment only in time of emergency. Marius recruited soldiers from the poorest social class, but his need was not so much emergency as it was to secure a quick victory and a triumph back home. This action, in 107 BC, would begin to alter the overall composition of the Republican army, which eventually abolished the hierarchical structure based on wealth, age, and social standing by phasing out the divisions of *hastati, principes, triarii* and *velites*. All soldiers became equal, highly trained heavy infantry, each carrying a *pilum* and a *gladius,* which the military now provided for them—since poor recruits still could not afford to buy their own weapons.[38] Known as the Marian reforms, this new system also replaced the three-lined manipular legion with a three-lined structure of ten cohorts. Furthermore, since the Social War (91–87 BC) granted citizenship to all peoples of the Italian peninsula, they also eliminated the *alae* division. Now all soldiers—allied and Roman—fought together in the legions. Over time, military service became a career that poor men pursued and which lasted for much of their adult life.

However, despite their eagerness to join the military, recompense was never sufficient enough, especially considering the growing political corruption and civil wars at home.[39] Driving many of these crises was a concern regarding the resettlement of returning soldiers. It became evident that more radical military reform was essential. Around the time of Caesar (100 BC–44 BC), the military pay increased twofold—from 112.5 *denarii* per year to 225. The slow but steady move away from propertied soldiers during the second century BC, led to an ever-increasing recruitment of the proletarian class, but, Rome still had not implemented a permanent standing army of professionally trained soldiers.[40]

In spite of the enduring success of their constitution, the Republic's system of checks and balances ultimately floundered. Continued conflicts drove

them ever closer to a system of one-man rule.[41] In 30 BC, Roman statesman Octavian (63 BC–14 AD) defeated Roman politician Mark Antony (83 BC–30 BC) and his lover, the Egyptian queen Cleopatra (51 BC–30 BC) at the Battle at Actium (32 BC–30 BC). Octavian, as well as the majority of the Roman Senate, had seen Antony's romance with the Egyptian queen as a threat to the unity and hegemony of Rome. Cleopatra's ambition was to strengthen the Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt. To this end, she used Antony's influence as well as that of her eldest son Caesarion—born from her previous relationship with Julius Caesar. Caesarion was a likely claimant to the throne of Egypt, but his ascension would have potentially handed Rome's hegemony over to Egypt and made Rome an Egyptian province. In August of 30 BC, Octavian ordered the death of seventeen-year-old Caesarion. This effectively converted Egypt into a Roman province.[42] Both Antony and Cleopatra died by their own hands soon afterward. On January 16, 27 BC, the Senate proclaimed Octavian Emperor of Rome by conferring the title of *augustus* on him. Thereafter, Octavian became known as Augustus, the first emperor of Rome. One of his earliest missions was to create a permanent standing army and he did so by definitively transforming the military from a combination of conscripts and volunteers to an all-volunteer standing army of long-term highly trained soldiers, regardless of financial or social standing.

About the Author

Mary Jo Davies is a graduate of history, having earned her Master's Degree in ancient and medieval studies from American Public University in 2018. She spends her time researching and writing articles for publication in scholarly journals. Although she writes on a variety of topics, her primary focus is on warfare in the ancient world. Apart from her journal contributions, she is compiling her published articles into a book encompassing warfare from the late Bronze Age through the end of the Roman Republic.

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Endnotes

1 Rome understood that monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies—on their own—tended to deviate into their evil twins: tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy. To counteract this and avoid collapse, Rome combined all three elements into one governing body and included a system of checks and balances that would help each group to develop a respectful relationship with the other. The highest-ranking officials were the consuls who represented the monarchic element; the senate (made up of noblemen) represented the aristocratic element; and the Roman citizens made up the democratic element.

2 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *The Roman Antiquities,* 1.6.2, trans. Earnest Cary, Ph.D. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937. Archive.org. Accessed December 1, 2022. https://archive.org/details/romanantiquities01dionuoft/page/20/mode/2up?view=theater; Note: the Roman province of the Greek city of Halicanarssus was located in Anatolia, present-day Turkey. The Greeks greatly influenced Roman culture. They had been colonizing the Italian peninsula since the eighth century BC. It was the Greeks—master writers for centuries—who taught the Romans the art of writing history.

3 Titus Livius (Livy), *The History of Rome* pr.4, The Perseus Catalog, accessed July 10, 2015, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu.

4 Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, 27.

5 William V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327–70 BC* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 63; Mary T. Boatwright et al., *The Romans: from Village to Empire,* 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 95.

6 The manipular legion is also known as the Polybian legion, since it was on account of the historian's writings that scholarship came to know the composition of the Roman forces of the mid-Republic.

7 Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army,* 26.

8 Adrian Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare*, reprint edition (New York, Basic Books, 2019), 9.

9 Polybius, *Histories* 6.24, The Perseus Catalog, accessed December 16, 2022, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu; Marcel Le Glay, et al., *A History of Rome*, 4th ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2009): 65. Despite the apparent association with the number "one-hundred," a century—in the ancient Roman military—may have never intended to refer to a count of "one-hundred." When concerning the maniples of the mid-republic, one century referred to sixty soldiers.

10 Polybius, *Histories*, 6.21.

11 Ibid., 6.21.

12 Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, 27.

13 Gregory Daly, *Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2002): 73.

14 Polybius, *Histories*, 6.22.

15 Martin Samuels, "The Reality of Cannae," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen Zeitschrift* 47, 1 (1990), 12-13.

16 Polybius, *Histories*, 6.25.

17 Gregory Daly, *Cannae*, 75.

18 Polybius, *Histories*, 6.22-23.

19 Ibid., 6.23.

20 Ibid., 18.30.

21 Michael J. Taylor, "Visual Evidence for Roman Infantry Tactics," *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 59/60 (2014/2015): 105-106.

22 The exact birth and death years of Vegetius are not known.

23 Vegetius, "Book III Dispositions for Action: Proper Distances and Intervals," in *De Re Militari,* translation Dr. James Harper and Professor Lucille Adet (Dubai: Harper McLaughlin Adet Publications, 2019).

24 Taylor, "Visual Evidence for Roman Infantry Tactics," 106.

25 Polybius, *Histories*, 3.116.

26 Martin Samuels, "The Reality of Cannae," 24-25.

27 Polybius, *Histories*, 3.116.

28 Polybius, *Histories*, 6.26.

29 Ibid., 6.19; Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, 26.

30 Gregory Daly, *Cannae*, 75.

31 Cicero, *De Officis* 1.35, *The Perseus Catalog*, accessed December 16, 2022, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu.

32 Ibid., 1.38.

33 Le Glay, et al., *A History of Rome,* 123.

34 Polybius, *Histories*, 1.63.

35 Craige B. Champion, "Polybius on Political Constitutions, Interstate Relations, and Imperial Expansion," Academia.edu, accessed April 1, 2014: 12. http://www.academia.edu.

36 Luuk De Ligt, "Roman Manpower Resources and the Proletarianization of the Roman Army in the Second Century BC," in *The Impact of the Roman Army (200 B.C. – A.D. 476): Economic, Social, Political, Religious and Cultural Aspects,* Eds. Lukas de Blois, Elio Lo Cascio (Boston: Brill, 2007), 20.

37 Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, 49.

38 M. Cary and H. H. Scullard, *A History of Rome,* 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 1975): 219; Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army,* 44-47.

39 The civil wars were conflicts that plagued the last century of the Roman Republic between 88 BC and 28 BC, and led to the inevitable transition to Principate and the undisputed authority of one man.

40 G. R. Watson, "The Pay of the Roman Army. The Republic." *Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 7 no. 1 (1958): 119-120.

41 Mary Jo Davies, "Polybius on the Roman Republic: Foretelling a Fall," *Saber and Scroll* 4 no. 2 (2015): 101.

42 M. Cary and H. H. Scullard, *A History of Rome,* 297-298.